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ANOTHER BRIDGE TO CROSS:
BETWEEN "OUTSIDE" AND "INSIDE"
Pauline E. Peterst
In her exhaustive article, Professor Obiora reflects on the
current debate, centered in America, on "female circumcision," and
uses this debate as a case study for posing the question of how
courts of law and legal strategists can find a "balance" between
culturally diverse precepts and universal rights.' She inquires into
the theoretical and normative bases for transcultural critique and
the circumstances in which "outsiders" can evaluate a cultural
practice. She also analyzes the efficacy of legal strategies for ef-
fecting reform or social transformations.
The latter topics lead her to consider the arguments, proce-
dures, and sanctions recently employed in different courts and legal
fora. My own interests and experience fit me more for engaging
with the former issue-the foundations for "transcultural cri-
tique"--than the latter. I write as a social anthropologist (trained to
think about "cultural difference"), a researcher with long experience
in south-central Africa (though not in areas where female circumci-
sion is practiced), and a feminist with a keen interest in gender
relations and inequalities. I thus limit my commentary to these
foundational matters, taking the case of female circumcision as a
specific instance. How might one understand "female circumci-
sion"? Is it the same thing as "genital mutilation" or, alternatively,
what's in a name? What does it mean to label an issue "cultural"?
I appreciated Obiora's cogent and subtle exposition of the
dangers of reification and essentialism in the debate over female
t Research Associate, Harvard Institute for International Development; Lecturer,
Department of Anthropology, Harvard University.
1. See L. Amede Obiora, Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics and Intransi-
gence in the Campaign Against Female Circumcision, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 275
(1997).
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circumcision. As she points out, "female circumcision" is a catego-
ry that describes only some of the practices of genital alteration
that vary from minor "pricking" through degrees of excision to
infibulation.2 "Mutilation" -has an even narrower ambit, evoking the
most extreme forms of alteration and implying severe and incapaci-
tating damage. Recognizing the problem of the mismatch between
descriptive categories and the empirical realities they purport to
describe is centrally important before any conceptual, political, or
legal progress can be had in the debate over female circumcision.
The problem is particularly acute in cross-cultural comparisons,
and, thus, is a staple focus of anthropology.
Many anthropologists have drawn on Wittgenstein's idea of
"family resemblances" to describe the overlapping and preamble
character of most conceptual boundaries. Rodney Needham, for
example, has constantly alerted anthropologists to the dangers of
cross-cultural comparisons if they forget that many key conceptual
categories "do[] not denote a discriminable class of phenomena,"3
but are, in Wittgenstein's terminology, "odd-job" words.4 Most of
these odd-job words, like that of "marriage," are "very handy" in
simple descriptive sentences, but "misleading in comparison and of
no real use .. in analysis." The conceptual class of "female
circumcision" similarly glosses such a wide variety of practices and
ideas that it requires careful specification for different groups in
different places at different times.
More recent discussions consider how particular categories are
constructed through a dialectical process of essentialized
oppositions (e.g., "gifts" versus "commodities," "production" versus
"consumption"). Since some degree of essentialism-as typifica-
tion-is inherent in all conceptual practice, we are enjoined to
avoid the dangers of essentialism by focusing on the relations
between identified categories and their empirical manifestations.6
These are relevant concerns in addressing the feminist critique of
2. ILd. at 287-89 (describing the various forms of genital alteration).
3. RODNEY NEEDHAM, RETHINKING KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE 5 (1971).
4. Id. (quoting LUDWIG wITrTENmEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKs 43-44 (1958)).
5. Id. at 7-8.
6. See James G. Carrier, Occidentalism: The World Turned Upside Down, 19 AM.
ETHNOLOGIST 195-212 (1992); MODERNrrY AND ITS MALCONTENTS: RITuAL AND POWER
IN POSTCOLONIAL AFRICA (Jean Comaroff & John Comaroff eds., 1993); CUL-
TURE/POWER/HISTORY: A READER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY (Nicholas B. Dirks
et al. eds., 1994); MICHAEL HERzFELD, ANTHROPOLOGY THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS
(1987); WanAM ROSEBERRY, ANT-RoPOLoGIEs AND HISToRIES (1989).
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"female circumcision," the popular debate in newspapers and other
mass media, and the task facing legal practitioners in making deci-
sions involving "female circumcision."
Obiora shows at some length that the current debate about
"genital mutilation" is at fault for neglecting the considerable varia-
tion in the practices of genital alteration (to use the most neutral,
albeit somewhat medicalized, phrase). Even less attention has been
paid to the variety in the ideas and values embraced by those who
endorse and practice genital alteration. Even the less emotive
descriptor, "female circumcision" (favored by Obiora), refers to
only some of the diverse practices.7 Obscuring the variation neces-
sarily inhibits full understanding of the social phenomenon being
described. In turn, if one aim of description is to derive legal and
administrative rules, procedures, and judgements to regulate the
practices, failure to pay attention to the disjuncuture between de-
scription and reality seriously jeopardizes their effectiveness.
The disjuncture between a descriptor and what it describes is
likely to be larger, however, when it is part of polemical debate,
activist lobbying, or political action. Scholarly discussion allows
scope for exceptions, modifications, or atypical instances-the
sometimes annoying "ifs and buts" of analysis. But political po-
lemic, by its nature, deals in large categories of contrast-the
blacks and whites of difference rather than the subtle grays of
nuance and indeterminancy. Hence, it is not surprising that the
most vociferous opponents of female circumcision should adopt the
label "genital mutilation" and focus on the most extreme forms of
the practice and their most dangerous outcomes. After all, such
opponents are less concerned with providing a comprehensive and
socio-culturally based understanding of the phenomenon than with
categorizing and packaging it in a way that allows them to stir
feelings and to mobilize support against the practice. A close par-
allel is the current dispute about abortion in the United States, with
its proliferation of categories purporting to describe the differences
among groups. The battle over appropriate naming--"right to life"
versus "pro-choice," "fetus-killers" versus "violators of human
rights"--resembles, though even more stridently, the conceptual
lobbying of "genital mutilation" versus "female circumcision" ver-
sus "genital alteration."
7. Obiora, supra note 1, at 289-90 (discussing alternative names for genital alter-
ations).
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Paradoxically, however, the extreme stance and language
adopted by many opponents may greatly reduce their chances of
reaching "the hearts and minds" of the proponents and supporters
of female circumcision. Perhaps this is akin to the well-known
outcome of polemic-the forcing of one's opponents into a more
rigid posture. More seriously for the debate on female circumci-
sion, the "hyperbole of monocultural indignation,"8 screamed by
Daly and others,9 leads them to ignore the dissent within the soci-
eties where female circumcision is practiced. In fact, this topic is
also unfortunately ignored by Obiora in her understandable concen-
tration on the debate among feminists and international groups.
The signs of disagreement within the groups who practice
some type of genital alteration mean, of course, that "indignation"
or rejection is anything but "monocultural" (that is, one cultural
gaze on a different culture). Just as the practices and ideas sur-
rounding female genital alteration are widely various across groups
and countries, so do attitudes towards it vary within groups.
As I started to write my commentary on Obiora's article, I
read an account in the New York Times of the recent case of Ms.
Kassindja, a young woman from Togo, who had been granted
asylum by the United States on the grounds of her being unwilling
to return home for fear of being circumcised."° The article gave
an account of a visit by the reporter to Ms. Kassindja's family in
Togo. Her late father had not allowed his daughters to be circum-
cised because he was haunted, reportedly, by the severe pain expe-
rienced by his sister during and after her "genital cutting."" Ms.
Kassindja's mother, whose sister had died after undergoing the rite,
agreed with her husband. Ms. Kassindja had become exposed to
the dangers her father had shielded her from because, after his
death and following local custom, she had become the ward of her
father's male relatives who insisted on girls submitting to the rite.
Her prospective husband also insisted she be properly prepared for
marriage. As a result, she fled the country, helped by her mother
and elder sister, going first to Europe, then to the United States. 2
8. Id. at 289.
9. See, e.g., MARY DALY, GYN/EcOLOGY: THE METAETHICS OF RADICAL FtMINISM
159-60 (1978).
10. See Celia Dugger, A Refugee's Body is Intact but Her Family is Torn, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1996, at Al.
11. Id. at B6.
12. See id.
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This case exemplifies the internal disagreement that can exist
among people sharing not only the same "culture" but the same
locality and family relations. It suggests the need to put more
firmly on the future agenda of those of us, including Obiora, who
are concerned about female circumcision, the signal importance of
documenting and analyzing internal difference and disagreement. It
also indicates the necessity for "outsider" critics to forge alliances
with "insider" critics.
It may be that closer attention to such "internal" dissent would
have prevented Obiora, despite her best intentions, from sometimes
implying a stasis about things cultural. For example, Obiora refers
to activists discussing ways of containing the practice of female
circumcision while other women "remain faithful to their traditional
obligation to circumcise." 3 She also notes that, despite the debate,
and some signs of attitudes changing, "there has been no signifi-
cant decline in the practice."' 4 To emphasize the connectedness of
cultural practices and ideas, she uses the image of a "tapestry, or a
working whole, that disintegrates with rash interference."' 5
What these phrases (and others scattered through the article)
suggest is a seeming sameness and stasis about cultures. But is it
not likely that rather than "remain[ing] faithful to [the] traditional
obligation to circumcise,"' 6 many women feel obliged to circum-
cise precisely because of the growing public and international
opposition to female genital alteration? Moreover, it is likely that
the practices of genital alteration are themselves in the process of
change. For example, we know that female seclusion among the
Hausa of Northern Nigeria has increased over the past four de-
cades. This reflects not a continuing traditional force but the effects
of the damage. As some families have become more prosperous in
the course of commercialization, female seclusion as one mark of
wealth and social status has intensified. It seems likely that similar
social dynamics are at work in societies practicing female genital
alteration. The issue is not a contrast between tradition and (im-
plied) modernity, but the various ways in which a key practice is
variously interpreted by different groups at different times. For Mr.
Kassindja, female circumcision was a mark of regression and he
preferred to educate his daughters and to find husbands for them
13. Obiora, supra note 1, at 317.
14. Id.
15. Ia4 at 321.
16. Id. at 317.
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who agreed with him. His brothers and cousins disagreed. Why?
What are the different social and cultural currents swirling around
this small comer of Togo that may explain such differences?
The functionalist approaches to social analysis have almost
disappeared from modem anthropology. While still recognizing the
"connections" among things cultural and, sometimes, invoking
"patterns" or "logic," most anthropologists today are more interest-
ed in the discontinuities and disjunctures among people sharing
many cultural things in common. The current foci of anthropolo-
gists are more on heterogeneity, situatedness, multiplicity of "voic-
es," and so forth. To this extent, anthropology embraces a central
issue of most feminist analysis across disciplines-the determina-
tion to address "difference." Hence, when I noted above that "de-
spite her best intentions" Obiora sometimes leans towards an overly
functionalist and static concept of culture, 7 I meant that her treat-
ment of differences among women is exemplary. But a similar
treatment of "culture" is not evident. This, in turn, prevents her
from paying as much attention as she might to the differences in
opinions about female circumcision among women of a particular
cultural group. The potential advantage of such attention is that it
would provide us "outsiders" (that is, those not members of the
groups who circumcise) with a much wider range of rationales for
and against the range of practices and, hopefully, a better under-
standing of some of the social dynamics influencing those ratio-
nales. Furthermore, it should provide a basis for Obiora to engage
with different groups of women (and men) on her suggestion that
the more effective approach is not a radical rejection of all genital
alteration as "mutilation," but a proposal to shift towards "milder"
forms.' While this is an eminently sensible, rational, and prag-
matic proposal, it does appear to have leaped out of the mind of
Obiora, a clearly "reasonable" person! What we do not know is
whether proponents of such a proposal can enter into constructive
dialogue with the people most affected by female genital alteration.
Again, the abortion debate suggests caution in the face of suc h
optimism.
The comments I have made so far have remained "within" the
debate over female genital alteration, that is, taking the latter as
given and raising some issues of evidence and interpretation, such
17. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
18. See Obiora, supra note 1, at 286, 365.
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as cross-cultural variation in the practices, intra-cultural differences
of opinion towards the practices, and the conceptual dilemmas in
cross-cultural analysis. A different question may be posed from
"outside" the debate. Why is there, at present, an apparent fixation
with female circumcision or genital mutilation among a consider-
able body of feminists and commentators in the United States?
Since Obiora's main task is to assess the bases for legal and judi-
cial rules and procedures vis-a-vis genital alteration, she must re-
main within the debate. However, it is worth standing, for a mo-
ment, outside and looking in.
Asking this question involves less a social theoretical is-
sue-the pertinence of the analytical categories for interpreting the
phenomenon-and more one of the sociology of knowledge: Why
has this topic captured attention and what are the effects of this on
the debate? One consequence of this "hyperbolic" concern with
"genital mutilation" is mentioned by Obiora when she quotes
Angela Davis as saying that the ferocity of the debate has led
many American people to know only one thing about "African
women -- that they are subjected to the inhumanity of genital muti-
lation.19 I was stunned by this comment, because the vast majority
of anthropological cross-cultural writing on gender relations tends
to see the situation of African women as far superior to many
women throughout the rest of the world. In brief, the marriage
systems of Africa tend not to force full incorporation of the wife
into the kinship group of the husband, but allow her to retain a
strong place and stake in her natal group. The classic role of bride-
wealth is to secure a woman the protection of her "brothers" for
herself and her children vis-a-vis her husband and marital relatives.
In many places, a wife, especially as she becomes senior in rank to
junior wives, has considerable authority, able to make semi-autono-
mous decisions concerning land, crops, and income. Among groups
following matrilineal descent (children belong to the mother's natal
group) and uxorilocal residence (husbands come to live in their
wives' villages), the degree of women's authority and autonomy
(as sisters, female ancestors, and female political and ritual leaders)
may be considerably enlarged. In recent writings about gender,
anthropologists have tended to compare the relatively open gender
systems of Southeast Asia with those of Africa in contradistinction
19. See id. at 325 (quoting ANGELA Y. DAviS, WOMEN, CULTURE, AND POLITCS 116-
54 (1989)).
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to the far more patriarchal systems elsewhere. This is particularly
ironic, given that the furies are feminist.
An equally pernicious effect of the debate is to divide the
world into two groups-those who circumcise ("mutilate") their
women and those who do not. This is where Obiora's reference to
the "hyperbole of monocultural indignation" is apt. As Yael
Tamir argues, the oppositional stance to clitoridectomy ends by
implying the superiority of "our" treatment of women, which, in
the context of phenomena like wife beating, sexual abuse, the glass
ceiling, and so forth, is, to put it mildly, unwarranted.2'
The most obvious question thrown up by the hyperbolic de-
bate is why critics of female genital alteration have fixed on the
reduction or elimination of female sexual pleasure as a key reason
of their opposition? As Tamir wryly comments: "Not since Masters
and Johnson has the clitoris--or its absence-been a topic of such
intense debate." To be fair, many opponents focus on the physi-
cal dangers of female genital cutting. Nevertheless, and perhaps
inevitably in a period of intense mass media attention, the "control
of female sexuality" has tended to be stressed in many treatments
of the opposition to female circumcision. Obiora rightly criticizes
this tendency and suggests that the foregrounding of sexual plea-
sure occurs because this has been one of the central issues over
which feminists in the United States have fought.' I agree with
this but feel her characterization of feminist use of "patriarchy" is
a little unfair.24
While using patriarchy as a concept to describe entire systems
of male domination has enormous problems (glossing too broadly
and discriminating too little), it Would be incorrect to imply that its
use has focused on the control of female sexuality. At least, this is
not the case for anthropologists and historians of Africa whose use
of patriarchy tends to have been more influenced by justifiable
concerns about political and economic inequalities based on gender
and socio-cultural valuations privileging male over female, rather
than narrowly defined "sexual pleasure." It follows, then, that to
20. ld at 289 (emphasis added).
21. Yael Tamir, Hands Off Clitorldectomy, BOSTON REv., Summer, 1996, at 21.
22. ld.
23. Obiora, supra note 1, at 299-306 (discussing the feminist argument against genital
mutilation).
24. Id. at 301-304 (discussing the meaning of patriarchy and the feminist use of this
rationale).
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focus on the latter in a discussion of female circumcision threatens
to trivialize both the opposition and the support of the practices.
Again, one must urge more careful inquiry into the particular
grounds for both opposition and support in the groups where fe-
male genital alteration takes place. The link between the "outside"
questions and the "inside" ones is, in my opinion, precisely the
vacuum of detailed knowledge about the rationales for and against
the practices currently being deployed, and about the social dynam-
ics of which the practices of female genital alteration are part.
Without a broader perspective on what is happening to marriage, to
kinship, to income strategies and levels, to systems of rank and
status acquisition, to gender relations and conceptions-in short, for
the entire repertoire of socio-cultural process and the place of
gender in them, questions about female genital alteration can only
be partial and distorting. Only with this broader-and deep-
er-understanding can bridges between "insider" and "outsider" be
built.
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